Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1. SCOPE OF TREATISE, OBJECTIVES AND PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

§ 1:1 Scope of book
§ 1:2 The traditional corporate control pattern
§ 1:3 Losses and injustices to squeezes
§ 1:4 Losses to the economy
§ 1:5 Objectives of book

CHAPTER 2. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF SQUEEZE-OUTS

§ 2:1 Scope of chapter
§ 2:2 Greed and desire for power; Personality clashes, marital discord, and family quarrels; Basic conflicts of interest and disagreements over policy
§ 2:3 The inactive shareholder
§ 2:4 Death of founder or other key shareholder
§ 2:5 The problem of the aged founder who “hangs on”
§ 2:6 Drive of superior talent to rise
§ 2:7 The autocratic controlling shareholder; Acquiescence by some shareholders in assumption of special privileges by others
§ 2:8 Disregard of corporate ritual and failure to keep proper records
§ 2:9 View that corporation belongs to shareholder employees
§ 2:10 Viewing incorporated enterprise as a “partnership” or “family business”
§ 2:11 The obstreperous or uncooperative shareholder; The deteriorating shareholder-employee; Majority shareholders’ view that they are justified in eliminating a minority shareholder when personal relationships deteriorate
§ 2:12 Entry of minority shareholders into a competing business
§ 2:13 Failure to provide properly for entrepreneur after
the start-up or for new inventions by inventor-shareholder

§ 2:14 Issuance of small number of shares as incentive to employees or for other reasons; Gifts of shares to children

§ 2:15 Difficulty of disposing of a minority interest in a closely held business

§ 2:16 Difficulty of valuing a business interest

§ 2:17 Failure to consider all ramifications of business bargain and reduce entire bargain to writing

§ 2:18 Undercapitalization of business

§ 2:19 Failure to appreciate problems that might arise out of change in ownership and control

§ 2:20 Business participants' failure to obtain preventive legal services and inability of many lawyers to supply adequate preventive services

CHAPTER 3. SQUEEZE-OUT TECHNIQUES: REDUCING A PARTICIPANT'S RETURN (OR INCREASING THE CONTROLLING PERSON'S RETURN); USING GOVERNANCE OR CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS

A. INTRODUCTION

§ 3:1 Scope of chapter

§ 3:2 Squeeze techniques in general

§ 3:3 Legal principles that obstruct relief

B. TECHNIQUES RELATED TO REDUCING ONE PARTICIPANT'S RETURN OR INCREASING RETURNS OF CONTROLLING PARTICIPANTS

§ 3:4 Dividend withholding—Variations in the setting and the technique

§ 3:5—Remedies of the squeezee

§ 3:6 Excluding minority shareholders from company employment and eliminating them from the directorate

§ 3:7 Siphoning off earnings by high compensation to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Section Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:8</td>
<td>Siphoning off earnings—Remedies of the minority shareholder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:9</td>
<td>Siphoning off corporate earnings by leases and loans favorable to majority shareholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:10</td>
<td>Siphoning off a corporation's profits by having other enterprises perform services for it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:11</td>
<td>Siphoning off earnings by other contractual arrangements; Failure to enforce contracts for benefit of corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:12</td>
<td>Fraudulent or unfair contracts: Squeezee's remedies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:13</td>
<td>Corporation's purchase of shares from majority shareholder at high price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:14</td>
<td>Appropriation of corporate assets, contracts, or credit for personal use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:15</td>
<td>Usurping corporate opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:16</td>
<td>Dilution of minority shareholders' interests through issuance of stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:17</td>
<td>Withholding information—In general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3:18</td>
<td>—In buying out minority shareholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C. TECHNIQUES RELATED TO GOVERNANCE OR SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS**

| § 3:19 | Maneuvers related to corporate meetings; failure to hold meetings                                                                            |
| § 3:20 | Eliminating or circumventing cumulative voting                                                                                               |
| § 3:21 | Removal or imposition of stock transfer restrictions and buyback of shares                                                                  |
| § 3:22 | Manipulations of stock transfer restrictions                                                                                                 |
| § 3:23 | Valuation; Refusal of young shareholders to adjust periodically the transfer price of shares subject to a buy-out agreement                  |

**D. OTHER TECHNIQUES**

| § 3:24 | Transactions between a parent corporation and partly owned subsidiary                                                                       |
| § 3:25 | Trusts as controlling shareholders                                                                                                           |
| § 3:26 | Squeeze-outs of majorities by minorities                                                                                                     |
| § 3:27 | Using legal processes as a squeeze technique                                                                                                |
| § 3:28 | Other squeeze-out techniques; Miscellaneous oppressive practices                                                                            |
CHAPTER 4. SQUEEZE-OUT TECHNIQUES: SALE OF CONTROL AND RELATED TECHNIQUES

§ 4:1 Scope of chapter
§ 4:2 Transactional settings for control premiums
§ 4:3 Substitutability of alternative transactional settings available to purchaser seeking to acquire control and its impact on control premiums
§ 4:4 Traditional legal doctrine
§ 4:5 Theories about control premiums
§ 4:6 Empirical studies of control premiums
§ 4:7 Misrepresentations, omissions and fraud
§ 4:8 Misrepresentations, omissions and fraud if the plaintiff does not buy or sell
§ 4:9 Looting cases
§ 4:10 Sale of office
§ 4:11 Control premiums as breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty
§ 4:11.50 Who is a Controlling Shareholder?
§ 4:12 Controlling shareholders ability to assert fiduciary duties in defense of control premiums
§ 4:13 Revlon applications in a control premium setting
§ 4:14 Control premiums in antitakeover statutes
§ 4:15 Appraisal or fiduciary duty in cash out mergers and control premiums
§ 4:16 Oppression claims and control premiums

CHAPTER 5. SQUEEZE-OUT TECHNIQUES: FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES

A. INTRODUCTION

§ 5:1 Scope of chapter
§ 5:2 Procedures for effectuating fundamental corporate changes; Susceptibility to use in squeeze plays
§ 5:3 Historical trend of statutory and judicial developments on use of fundamental corporate changes to accomplish squeeze-outs
B. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES SUSCEPTIBLE TO USE IN SQUEEZE PLAYS: MERGERS AND RELATED TRANSACTIONS

§ 5:4 Squeeze-outs through mergers
§ 5:5 Eliminating minority shareholders by short form mergers; use of short form merger by individual majority shareholder
§ 5:6 Merger variations: Triangular mergers and reverse triangular mergers used to avoid shareholder vote or dissenters’ rights or to squeeze-out minority
§ 5:7 Two-step transactions: Tender offers plus mergers
§ 5:8 Going private
§ 5:9 Compulsory share exchange
§ 5:10 Mergers used to avoid “first option” rights or redemption obligations
§ 5:11 Mergers used to terminate derivative suits
§ 5:12 Mergers in limited liability companies
§ 5:13 Mergers between different kinds of entities

C. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES: CHANGING SHARE RIGHTS THROUGH CHARTER AMENDMENTS OR OTHERWISE

§ 5:14 Charter or bylaw amendment—A squeeze technique
§ 5:15 Reverse stock split
§ 5:16 Making shares redeemable
§ 5:17 Alteration or destruction of preferences or other rights of preferred shareholders
§ 5:18 Recapitalizations, including dual class recapitalization

D. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES: SALE OF ASSETS AND/OR DISSOLUTION

§ 5:19 Sale of corporate business, franchise and assets
§ 5:20 Sale of assets at an inadequate price or in circumstances oppressive to minority shareholders; shareholder remedies
§ 5:21 Sale of assets to circumvent minority power to veto desired corporate action or avoid a buy-sell agreement

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§ 5:22 Sale of assets to set stage for oppression of
minority
§ 5:23 Splitting off the profitable part of business and
transferring it to majority shareholders
§ 5:24 Mortgage of all corporate assets
§ 5:25 Dissolution
§ 5:26 Inadequacy of value of proportionate part of
corporation’s physical assets as payment for
objecting shareholder’s interest in dissolved
corporation

E. MISCELLANEOUS METHODS; CATEGORIES

§ 5:27 Obtaining amendment of the corporation statute
or enactment of special statute to facilitate
squeeze-out
§ 5:28 Creation of a subsidiary or a holding company as
a maneuver in a squeeze play; possibility of
transferring business to a company in a state
where the climate is more favorable to a
squeeze-out
§ 5:29 Use of bankruptcy or other creditor proceedings
to eliminate minority shareholders; Intentional
destruction of business; purchase and
enforcement of claim against corporation

F. REMEDIES FOR MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL
CORPORATE CHANGE

§ 5:30 Overview of remedies afforded minority
shareholders in fundamental corporate changes
§ 5:31 Fundamental corporate changes that avoid
shareholder voting or exit rights
§ 5:32 The doctrine of de facto merger
§ 5:33 Appraisal rights; Limitations on the effectiveness
of dissenters’ statutory right to have shares
purchased
§ 5:34 Procedural difficulties associated with appraisal
§ 5:35 Costs involved in asserting appraisal rights
§ 5:36 Suits for breach of fiduciary duty
§ 5:37 Cleansing of self-interested status in fiduciary
duty suits
§ 5:38 Right to sue for breach of fiduciary duty and for
appraisal in two-step transactions

xxii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:39</td>
<td>Exclusivity of appraisal or a fiduciary duty claim for a minority shareholder squeezed out in a merger or other fundamental control transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:40</td>
<td>Relation to oppression remedies and other remedies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:41</td>
<td>Valuation in appraisal statutes and fiduciary duty suits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:42</td>
<td>Time of valuation; Excluding value created by the merger from an appraisal calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:43</td>
<td>Valuation: Discounts for minority status of lack of marketability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:44</td>
<td>Inclusion of a valuation reflecting majority misconduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:45</td>
<td>The impact of market price on valuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:46</td>
<td>Distinctive valuation rules for short form mergers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:47</td>
<td>Procedures for determining valuation and measure of recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:48</td>
<td>Disclosure obligations under state law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:49</td>
<td>Attacks on mergers or other shareholder action as violative of federal law: Proxy regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:50</td>
<td>Federal remedies: SEC Rule 10b-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:51</td>
<td>Federal remedies: The registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:52</td>
<td>Federal remedies: Going private regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5:53</td>
<td>Litigation in fundamental corporate changes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>